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LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE, Gerald Gunther,
New York: Alfred A. Knopf (1994). 818 pp.
At the end of the preface to Learned Hand, The Man and
the Judge, Gerald Gunther states that he began work on the
biography despite the fear that his admiration for Hand might
preclude an unprejudiced portrayal. He ended, however,
"hoping that I have pictured him fully, warts and all. He
remains my idol still." I believe Gunther achieved his goal and
in the process he has given us a positively superb biography of
the man, as well as a great insight into the judge.
As a student at Harvard College, Hand was influenced by
the Harvard philosopher/psychologist William James.'
According to Gunther, Hand was fond of the distinction James
drew between the tender-minded and the tough-minded.' In
James's view, the qualities of the tender-minded are that they
are rationalistic (thinking in principles), intellectualistic
(thinking in terms of abstractions), idealistic, philosophical,
optimistic, religious, free-willist, monistic and dogmatical. On
the other hand, the tough-minded are empirical (thinking in
* Learned Hand's conspicuous absence from the Supreme Court prompted
popular journals of his day to acknowledge his place in American jurisprudence by
referring to Hand as the "Tenth Justice." See Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Foreword to
GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE at ix (1994).
** Senior Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
1 See GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE 35-37
(1994).
2 Id. at 369; see also WILLIAMT JAMES, PRAGMATISM: A NEW NAME FOR SOME
OLD WAYS OF THINKING (1907) (Chapter I, 'The Dilemma in Philosophy").
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terms of facts), sensationalistic (gaining knowledge through the
senses), materialistic, pessimistic, irreligious, fatalistic,
pluralistic, and skeptical. Although Hand tended more toward
tough-mindedness-he was irreligious, pluralistic and
skeptical-Gunther demonstrates that Hand was a blend of
Jamesian components: he thought both in terms of principles
and facts and could deal with abstractions as physical realities.
In Hand's earlier career, Gunther informs us that Hand
was optimistic. This optimism manifested itself in Hand's
association with reform movements. We are told, for example,
of Hand's belief in Herbert Croly's New Nationalism.' Indeed,
it was Hand's influence which led Theodore Roosevelt to utilize
much of Croly's thinking as a basis for the Progressive Party
platform. Hand even ran for Chief Judge of the New York
Court of Appeals in an effort to bolster the Bull Moose
movement and the Progressive Party's position in New York.4
In addition, Gunther informs us that Hand had a role in the
founding of the New Republic magazine in 1913.
In his latter years, however, Hand was, if not pessimistic,
at least less optimistic about the state of human nature and
the human condition. In a particularly revealing letter to
Bernard Berenson, Hand wrote:
My despair when I do despair, which is oftener than I wish, is
grounded in the fact that it does seem as though the last
achievement of mankind was a detachment, a skepticism, an
aloofness from conviction, which has proved the best road, and
nearly the only road, that has led us out of the trees ... . [As a
consistent skeptic, I must be skeptical as to the supreme value of
skepticism, and that too I shall try to be.6
But privately he was optimistic; when he was 75 he said, "Now
the question is: 'How long, oh, Lord, how long?' Curiously,
perhaps, I don't want to shorten it a day; I am having a good
time."7
' GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 190-269 (Chapter V, "The Peak of Political
Enthusiasm: Herbert Croly, Theodore Roosevelt, and the Progressive Years").
' GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 235. Despite losing the election, Hand was
satisfied with the result, as it boded well for his career, as well as the Progressive
Party's future. Id. at 236-37.
GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 241-69.
6 GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 582.
' GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 573.
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Gunther shows us how, as a human being, Hand himself
had many contradictions and paradoxes. He could be
gregarious-he enjoyed singing Gilbert and Sullivan-yet he
spent much time alone. He could be both gruff and sweet. He
could be domineering in the courtroom, yet he considered
himself a Caspar Milquetoast8 and was always somewhat self-
deprecating.
Hand appeared excessively modest yet, as he admitted, he
"longed as the thing beyond all else.., to get a place on [the
Supreme Court]. " He was a doer and could force himself to
make decisions, yet he had many self-doubts, and, until he
became a district judge in 1909 at the age of thirty-seven, his
legal career had been less than positively successful.' °
Hand was anything but a bleeding heart liberal-in his
speech at the presentation of the portrait of Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr. to the Harvard Law School on March 20,
1930," he referred deprecatingly to "those who live in chronic
moral exaltation, whom the ills of this world make ever
restive, who must be always fretting for some cure. "" As a
further example, Gunther shows us how Hand was quite slow
to respond even to the implorations of Felix Frankfurter, one of
his closer friends and longtime correspondents, to the plight of
Sacco and Vanzetti, two Italian immigrants whom many
people, including Frankfurter, believed had not received a fair
trial because of their political affiliations."
At the same time, however, he was friendly to the only
lower-east-side Jew in his college and combated Albany's Fort
Orange Club's Jewish-exclusion rules. 4 In addition, Hand
was the author of an influential letter in opposition to
President A. Lawrence Lowe's proposal to introduce a quota
system at Harvard, which was designed primarily for the
8 GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 586. Caspar Milquetoast, a character created by'
H.J. Webster, denotes one who has a meek, timid and retiring nature. AMERICAN
HERITAGE DICTIONARY 798 (2d coll. ed. 1991).
' GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 569 (letter to Felix Frankfurter).
10 GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 53-71.
" Learned Hand, Mr. Justice Holmes, Address at Langdell Hall (1930), in THE
SPIRIT OF LIBERTY: PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF LEARNED HAND 57 (compiled by
Irving Dilliard 1952) [hereinafter THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY].
12 Id. at 62.
13 GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 388-95.
14 GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 115-17.
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purpose of limiting the proportion of undergraduate Jewish
students. 5
Furthermore, he became an active and energetic opponent
of McCarthyism, which he publicly denounced in an address to
education officials attending a meeting of the Board of Regents
in Albany.16 This address was reported on the front page of
the New York Times and was reprinted as the lead article in
the Saturday Review. 7  He continued speaking against
McCarthyism at the 48th Annual Session of the American
Jewish Committee on January 29, 1955, where he received the
organization's first American Liberties Medallion."8 Here, his
Jamesian philosophical bent surfaced once again when he
reflected that the true principles of civil liberties and human
rights
lie in habits, customs-conventions, if you will-that tolerate dissent
and can live without irrefragable certainties; that are ready to
overhaul existing assumptions; that recognize that we never see
save through a glass, darkly; and that at long last we shall succeed
only so far as we continue to undertake "the intolerable labor of
thought"--that most distasteful of all our activities. 9
In the realm of constitutional law, we see the various pulls
at work on Hand and his own tough- and tender-mindedness.
Gunther recounts Hand's law school familiarity with,
and-along with Frankfurter 2°--belief in, the teachings of
James Bradley Thayer,2 who maintained that judicial review
is of doubtful necessity as a matter of principle and that giving
judges the powers of platonic guardians, if judicial review is
exercised too broadly, tends to weaken democracy. Perhaps the
best expression of this view was set forth in Hand's famous
" Learned Hand, Christians and Jews (1922), in THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY, supra
note 11, at 20-23.
16 GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 588-89. This address made the front page of the
New York Times and was later reprinted as a lead article in the Saturday Review.
Id. at 589.
17 GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 589.
18 GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 591.
19 GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 591.
20 See Felix Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Cardozo and Public Law, 52 HARV. L.
REV. 440, 443 & n.7 (1939) (lauding Thayer).
21 See James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of
Constitutional Law, 7 HARv. L. REV. 129 (1893), reprinted in JAMES B. THAYER,
LEGAL ESSAYS 1 (1927).
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1944 "I-Am-an-American-Day" speech entitled, "The Spirit of
Liberty," in which he said
I often wonder whether we do not rest our hopes too much upon
constitutions, upon laws and upon courts. These are false hopes;
believe me, these are false hopes. Liberty lies in the hearts of men
and women; when it dies there, no constitution, no law, no court can
save it; no constitution, no law, no court can even do much to help
it. While it lies there it needs no constitution, no law, no court to
save it.'
But one can go back to Thayer to see the origins of Hand's
perhaps most oft-quoted passage: "Under no system can the
power of courts go far to save a people from ruin; our chief
protection lies elsewhere.""
We see this skepticism of judicial review expressed again
in Hand's 1908 Harvard Law Review article, "Due Process of
Law and the Eight Hour Day."24 The article denounced the
Supreme Court's (later much-criticized) decision in Lochner v.
New York,' in which the Court intensively scrutinized and
then struck down state legislation that established maximum
work hours for bakery employees. In a later New Republic
article,26 Hand again criticized one of the worst of the
Supreme Court's Lochner-type decisions, Coppage v. Kansas,"
where the Court struck down, as a matter of freedom of
contract, legislation prohibiting "yellow dog" contracts, under
which employees were prohibited from becoming or remaining
union members. His final anonymous editorial comment,
written in 1923, was prompted by the Supreme Court's
decision in Adkins v. Children's Hospital," which struck down
the District of Columbia's congressionally adopted minimum
wage law for women, also in the name of freedom of contract.
Hand carried his dislike for Lochner-type, interventionist,
substantive due process law decisions consistently throughout
his life. Indeed, in a tribute to Chief Justice Stone, Hand
' Learned Hand, The Spirit of Liberty, in THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY, supra note
11, at 189-90.
' THAYER, supra note 21, at 39.
24 21 HARV. L. REV. 495 (1908).
25 198 U.S. 45 (1905); see GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 118.
"' Normal Inequalities of Fortune, NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 6, 1915, at 5 (published
anonymously).
" 236 U.S. 1 (1915); see GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 248.
28 261 U.S. 525 (1923); see GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 251.
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somewhat ironically expressed his view that the courts had no
more latitude for enforcing their own predilections when they
were concerned with personal interests than when they were
concerned with property interests.29 Certainly, his Holmes
Lectures,"0 given in February of 1958 when Hand had just
turned eighty-seven, condemned the Supreme Court's "patent
usurpation" of powers that did not properly belong to the
courts and which thereby turned them into a "third legislative
chamber."31 In his second Holmes Lecture Hand stated:
I can see no more persuasive reason for supposing that a legislature
is a priori less qualified to choose between "personal" than between
economic values; and there have been strong protests, to me
unanswerable, that there is no constitutional basis for asserting a
larger measure of judicial supervision over the first than over the
second."
Of course, this deferential theory of constitutional review, quite
contrary to that of the Warren Court and, indeed, calling into
question such pillars of the law as Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation, has received considerable revival of interest in the
1980s and 1990s both on the Supreme Court and in certain
academic circles.
Gunther concludes "that [Hand's] doubts about judicial
activism . . increased during his last years."33 In contrast to
his conservative view on this area of the law, Hand's views in
other areas were more liberal. For example, Hand's view of
freedom of speech, as expressed in Masses Publishing Co. v.
Patten,34 "was extraordinarily speech-protective," far more so
than the "clear and present danger" test which Holmes had
announced two years prior.35  In addition, Hand wrote
courageous opinions in two Cold-War espionage cases, United
States v. Coplon" and United States v. Remington,37 in
which he voted to reverse the convictions of two defendants on
29 GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 565.
30 GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 653.
31 GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 654.
GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 656.
GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 664.
34 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917), rev'd, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917); see GUNTHER,
supra note 1, at 152.
"5 See GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 152.
36 185 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1950).
37 208 F.2d 567 (2d Cir. 1953).
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the grounds of failure to disclose wiretap records to the
defendant and prosecutorial abuse of power, respectively, the
latter in dissent. Finally, Hand's outspoken public attacks on
McCarthyism demonstrate that Hand's deference ended at the
bench and did not cross over into his personal life.
In an earlier article that goes more fully into the Masses
case, Professor Gunther claims that the message of Hand's
Holmes Lectures did resemble, even if it exceeded, those he
had articulated earlier."8 But one suspects that the professor
would side at least with Paul Freund's criticism that, "The
question [regarding judicial intervention] is not whether the
courts can do everything but whether they can do
something." 9 And one senses that the professor might agree
with this reviewer that judicial review results in:
the day-to-day concrete exposition of those rights not only as a
continuing educational process--educative to expositor and expositee
alike-but as an activity at the heart of our democratic system ....
[I]ndeed there is no other institution in our society that continually
carries on a systematic exposition of human rights and their relation
to society. The "dialogue" then serves not only as an inspiration to
both judges and nation, but as a bedrock against the encroachment
of tyranny, whatever its derivation, and especially when the sources
of that tyranny are, as they are sometimes, hidden in the "hearts of
men and women.'
In any event, Gunther concludes that
[u]ltimately, the bleakness, pessimism, and extremism of Hand's
final major statement did not do full justice to the richness, subtlety,
and complexity of his lifelong search for a delicate balance between
the competing pressures of passionate devotion to free speech in an
open society on the one side and sensitivity to the legitimate
restraint on courts in a democracy on the other.4'
Professor Gunther's biography was over twenty-five years
in the making, and its thoroughness shows. Indeed, Justice
3 GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 665. For a discussion of the Holmes-Hand
discourse on the Masses case, see Gerald Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins
of Modern First Amendment Doctrine: Some Fragments of History, 27 STAN. L.
REV. 719, 722-55 (1975).
" GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 665; see also PAUL A. FREUND, THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 89 (1961).
4" James L. Oakes, The Proper Role of the Federal Courts in Enforcing the Bill
of Rights, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 911, 926 (1979).
"' GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 672.
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Powell's Foreword points out that Gunther was dealing with
over 100,000 written pages-box after box of documents given
to him as Hand's literary executor.42 Perhaps another reason
for the delay in publication was not to upset the Hand family
with the rather unflattering portrait the biography gives of
Hand's wife, Frances Fincke. In any event, Mrs. Hand is one of
the most unsympathetic persons in the entire book. Gunther
informs us that her "Boston marriage"'43 to a fellow Bryn
Mawr College student never came off by virtue of her marriage
to Hand. In addition, Gunther gives a tasteful, if
unsympathetic, recounting of her three decades of close
relationship to a Dartmouth professor, Louis Dow, in Cornish,
New Hampshire-the two of them took trips to Europe
together without Learned. In a similar vein, Gunther occasion-
ally mentions her not-so-warm letters to her husband.
The book has few, if any, shortcomings. Certainly, Hand's
wife's relationship with Dow had to have played a role in
Hand's life, but we never quite find out what it is. It may be,
too, that Mrs. Hand's premarital relationship with Mildred
Minturn, her Bryn Mawr friend, should not have been so
detailed. The only other portion of the book that seems to be
slightly questionable is the long discussion of the break up of
Hand's friendship with Walter Lippman, which evidently
occurred when Lippman remarried the wife of a close mutual
friend. We see, however, in that event a different side of
Hand, the shy side. He never discussed the matter with
Lippman because he felt reluctant to do so, just as one would
suppose he would have felt reluctant to discuss the
relationship between Louis Dow and Mrs. Hand.
Professor Gunther was a law clerk to Judge Hand in the
early 1950s, and his book has been reviewed favorably in the
" Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Foreword to GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE
MAN AND THE JUDGE at ix (1994).
"' GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 96. A "Boston marriage" refers to a long-term
relationship between two unmarried women who sought more than a domestic life,
but were interested in a relationship that supported their intellectual and
professional aspirations. Id.
44 GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 489-502.
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New York Times45 and in the New York Review Of Books.46
The latter review, written by the writer/philosopher Ronald
Dworkin, another former law clerk to Hand, is especially
noteworthy because Dworkin seeks to answer Hand's Holmes
Lecture, "Extremism." Dworkin concludes that Hand's main
reasons for denying judges any power of judicial review,
despite the Constitution's direct instruction that government
be limited by moral principle, might actually "count against
rather than for his conclusions."47 Dworkin also concludes
that developments since Hand's day have made for a greater
understanding of the national sense of justice and the public
spirit of liberty advanced by virtue of the dialogue to which I
have previously referred. Dworkin concludes that "though he
was a great judge, it was the man I loved." Gerald Gunther
has crafted a wonderful book that illuminates each of these
aspects.
Needless to say, this book is must reading for any student
of the law and, I would say, any student of democracy.
" Herbert Mitgang, The Top-Level Player Who Never Made the Team, N.Y.
TIMES, May 13, 1994, at C28; John T. Noonan, Jr., Master of Restraint, N.Y.
TIMES, May 1, 1994, § 7 (Book Review), at 7.
46 Ronald Dworkin, Mr. Liberty, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Aug. 11, 1994, at 14.
47 Id. at 14, 22.
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